Post by tufta on Nov 9, 2010 12:15:25 GMT 1
WI(L)DER EUROPE
Pragmatic Poland is now a player in European diplomacy
04.11.2010 / 04:34 CET
A less idealistic approach to foreign policy has allowed Poland to prosper and catch up on its missed decades.
On one thing, critics and supporters agree: Poland's relations with Russia have been transformed in the past three years. But into what?
For some, the shift is nothing short of surrender, explicable only through naïveté or cynicism, and tantamount to treason. Poland has become a Russian-German condominium where only money matters, where opposition voices are marginalised – or even murdered.
Assessment of Polish foreign policy suffers from the overheated domestic political atmosphere. That overshadows the real shift: that Poland has finally become a country that matters – a player, not a playground, in European diplomacy.
One example is the upcoming EU presidency, where the scale, drive and focus of the Polish effort are impressive. Organisation and presentation are good, but so, largely, is substance. Critics of the government may bemoan the fact that Poland has good relations with Germany, Russia and the US simultaneously. But is worse really better? Calmer relations with Russia, for example, have helped trade nearly double in three years.
Some things are questionable, such as inviting Sergei Lavrov to an annual meeting of Polish ambassadors. The Russian foreign minister represents a regime that beats, jails and kills its opponents, rigs elections, squashes independent media, lies about its crimes and occupies another country's territory. Let top Russians give speeches in Warsaw by all means, but this event deserved a friend, not a business partner. Supposedly, Lavrov gave valuable insights, faced tough questions, and did Poland a favour by coming. I'm dubious.
Yet Poland also supports the Katyn relatives' court case against Russia at Strasbourg and pays their legal costs. The foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, supports a ban on visas for the swindlers and murderers responsible for the death in prison of the Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. Poland does more than any other EU country to promote democracy in Belarus.
Poland used to be even more idealistic: it ran to help the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, took big risks for Georgia and cared deeply about democracy in Ukraine and Belarus. Little of that paid off.
Poland is now a bit more pragmatic. It no longer idolises the US. It no longer feels itself to be the messiah of Europe, destined by history to liberate Russia from autocracy, to bring Georgia into NATO, to recreate a Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, or to build a powerful, free and prosperous Ukraine. Pragmatic Poland prefers hard numbers to nice words. If they do not add up, tough: Poland will concentrate on building the roads, railways, power plants and pipelines that best serve its national interest. The main task of Polish foreign policy is to enable the modernisation of Poland, catching up on the missed decades and seizing the chances now on offer. Poland's biggest historical disasters have come from over-estimating its strength; in future, Poland needs to be stronger, not braver.
What may be missing is another component: reassurance. Poland is vital for the Baltic states' national, energy and economic security. In its romantic era, Poland avuncularly ignored little local difficulties in places like Lithuania, and focused on the great ideal of consolida-ting freedom, justice and prosperity in the post-Soviet neighbourhood. Many feel that has ebbed.
Poland has benefited hugely from other countries' romantic vision of a Europe whole and free. It was not self-centred pragmatism that brought Poland into the EU and NATO, or that made Poles resist communism. Other countries – smaller, weaker and (I admit) sometimes run by highly tiresome people – still need Poland. I hope Poland will continue to reassure them now and stand by them in future.
The writer is central and eastern Europe correspondent of The Economist.
Pragmatic Poland is now a player in European diplomacy
04.11.2010 / 04:34 CET
A less idealistic approach to foreign policy has allowed Poland to prosper and catch up on its missed decades.
On one thing, critics and supporters agree: Poland's relations with Russia have been transformed in the past three years. But into what?
For some, the shift is nothing short of surrender, explicable only through naïveté or cynicism, and tantamount to treason. Poland has become a Russian-German condominium where only money matters, where opposition voices are marginalised – or even murdered.
Assessment of Polish foreign policy suffers from the overheated domestic political atmosphere. That overshadows the real shift: that Poland has finally become a country that matters – a player, not a playground, in European diplomacy.
One example is the upcoming EU presidency, where the scale, drive and focus of the Polish effort are impressive. Organisation and presentation are good, but so, largely, is substance. Critics of the government may bemoan the fact that Poland has good relations with Germany, Russia and the US simultaneously. But is worse really better? Calmer relations with Russia, for example, have helped trade nearly double in three years.
Some things are questionable, such as inviting Sergei Lavrov to an annual meeting of Polish ambassadors. The Russian foreign minister represents a regime that beats, jails and kills its opponents, rigs elections, squashes independent media, lies about its crimes and occupies another country's territory. Let top Russians give speeches in Warsaw by all means, but this event deserved a friend, not a business partner. Supposedly, Lavrov gave valuable insights, faced tough questions, and did Poland a favour by coming. I'm dubious.
Yet Poland also supports the Katyn relatives' court case against Russia at Strasbourg and pays their legal costs. The foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, supports a ban on visas for the swindlers and murderers responsible for the death in prison of the Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. Poland does more than any other EU country to promote democracy in Belarus.
Poland used to be even more idealistic: it ran to help the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, took big risks for Georgia and cared deeply about democracy in Ukraine and Belarus. Little of that paid off.
Poland is now a bit more pragmatic. It no longer idolises the US. It no longer feels itself to be the messiah of Europe, destined by history to liberate Russia from autocracy, to bring Georgia into NATO, to recreate a Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, or to build a powerful, free and prosperous Ukraine. Pragmatic Poland prefers hard numbers to nice words. If they do not add up, tough: Poland will concentrate on building the roads, railways, power plants and pipelines that best serve its national interest. The main task of Polish foreign policy is to enable the modernisation of Poland, catching up on the missed decades and seizing the chances now on offer. Poland's biggest historical disasters have come from over-estimating its strength; in future, Poland needs to be stronger, not braver.
What may be missing is another component: reassurance. Poland is vital for the Baltic states' national, energy and economic security. In its romantic era, Poland avuncularly ignored little local difficulties in places like Lithuania, and focused on the great ideal of consolida-ting freedom, justice and prosperity in the post-Soviet neighbourhood. Many feel that has ebbed.
Poland has benefited hugely from other countries' romantic vision of a Europe whole and free. It was not self-centred pragmatism that brought Poland into the EU and NATO, or that made Poles resist communism. Other countries – smaller, weaker and (I admit) sometimes run by highly tiresome people – still need Poland. I hope Poland will continue to reassure them now and stand by them in future.
The writer is central and eastern Europe correspondent of The Economist.