Post by Bonobo on Mar 19, 2022 21:09:24 GMT 1
The Russian army`s poor performance in Ukraine displays it is troubled by a lot of serious shortcomings.
One of the signs of the weakness of the Russian army is the fact it sends young conscripts, practically boys, to fight in Ukraine.
What the fact that conscripts are fighting in Ukraine tells us about the condition of the Russian army
Pushing unprofessional soldiers into battle is a sign of desperation.
Suzanne B. Freeman, Katherine Kjellstrom Elgin
7.1 thous.
Today, 13:40
Russian army in UkraineRussian army in Ukraine - EPA / STRINGER / PAP
Conscription is a thorny topic in Russia, and the Kremlin's use of conscripts indicates to what extent the country's leaders believed they could hide the cost of the war from society. But now that their deployment has become public, what does Russia's continued use of conscripts tell us about this war and the future course of the conflict?
The short answer is that the war is not going as well as planned, and the use of conscripts may create more problems for the Russian leadership.
The Russian military personnel consists of four basic groups: officers, (a very small pool of) non-commissioned officers, contract workers and conscripts. Historically, conscription in Russia has been used to ensure that large sections of the population receive military training in the event of mobilization for a great war and to reduce the cost of maintaining the army.
Invasion of Ukraine. The USA is considering disconnecting Russia from the GPS system [LIVE REPORT]
As a rule, military personnel in Russia are not allowed to travel abroad. Under current law, Russia requires all men between the ages of 18 and 27 to report for conscription, usually for a period of one year, and then transfer to the mandatory reserve.
Currently, most estimates say that around 25 percent. of the Russian army consists of conscripts, the number of which varies according to the military service and the type of unit. And although Russia has attempted to switch to a professional army - mainly to increase the level of training and expertise of its soldiers - the country has to reconcile professionalisation with the need to maintain a large army.
However, public support for conscription in Russia is limited, and the very appointment of conscripts is controversial. Conscripts tend to be less capable than their contract counterparts because their length of service limits their training. And although a longer conscription period would lead to the creation of a more efficient conscription force, such a decision would prove unpopular with the Russian public.
Consequently, if they are exploited, conscripts are typically hired in less technical-savvy roles, such as logistics, which has already proved to be a key problem in Russian operations in Ukraine.
Moreover, because of the widespread abuse of conscripts - the brutal Russian version of the Polish wave - used since the Soviet Union, conscripts also have lower morale and the units they serve have less coherence. The Russian military has had various successes in reducing the effects of this phenomenon, but bullying remains a serious problem, leading to widespread attempts to obtain discharge from service.
Moreover, the use of conscripts in active combat will affect many Russian families and may cause a negative public reaction as the number of victims increases. During the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, the Soviet command was so concerned about public indignation over the victims and the denial of the reality of the war that it sent home soldiers killed in action in sealed zinc coffins. This comparison shouldn't escape anyone's head.
Apparently, the internal pressure is so strong that the Russian government has felt compelled to admit that they are serving conscripts in Ukraine. Last Tuesday, Putin promised that no Russian conscripts would be used in the war against Ukraine, but a day later the Defense Ministry publicly confirmed that there were Russian conscripts in Ukraine and that some of them had been taken prisoner.
The Russian government has pledged to send them all home and prevent their further deployment. And earlier this week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in a speech on stopping the conflict, directly appealed to Russian conscripts to surrender.
Prior to their official announcement, reports of their presence were circulating in Russia, and although information from Ukraine is difficult to decode, texts to mothers and videos of crying soldiers at the front appeared. Videos of Russian prisoners suggest that at least some of them did not know they were going to fight in Ukraine, and there are reports of low morale among Russian soldiers.
In Russia, the Committee of Mothers of Soldiers also expressed concern that conscripts are forced to sign contracts before crossing the border with Ukraine - a practice reportedly used by Russia in Ukraine in 2014.
The use of conscripts by the Russian military, despite all these shortcomings, proves that the Kremlin thought of this campaign as very easy. Conscripts do not serve elite units, and early assessments of Russian operational plans suggest that it was the elite units that were supposed to secure the area quickly and without much resistance.
In the face of the unexpected results of the Ukrainian army, however, Russia had to send more units to combat and it is unlikely that it would have used conscripts if it did not consider it necessary - their involvement may also be a sign that attempts by contract soldiers to meet the military's staffing needs failed.
And if, as suggested by the Russian government, the sending of conscripts to Ukraine was accidental, this is a bad sign of the Russian command, as well as of serious problems with personnel control in the Russian officer corps.
The situation also suggests the extent to which Russian officials had to assume that they could control domestic discourse. While the Kremlin controls most of the media coverage and tightens its control of the information space more and more, bad news from the front is hard to hide. And when mothers are unable to call their sons or when they begin to return with wounds or in coffins, the realities of the war can fuel the anger of the Russian people, as was the case during the Soviet-Afghan war.
So the hands of the Russian government are tied. As the war is more difficult than anticipated, the military needs more personnel in combat and support roles. However, if it continues to use conscripts, especially in large numbers, this can be seen as a sign of increasing desperation.
Pushing more recruits into Ukraine or using them after promises to be brought home not only means that the Russian military is sending less capable forces to the front, but also risks increasing the human cost of the war in the country, which could lead to further public outrage .
Regardless of the reason for their deployment, the use of Russian conscripts in the war in Ukraine is a bad sign of the Russian army's capabilities and readiness for this conflict. And while we still do not know to what extent conscripts are represented in the Russian forces in Ukraine or in what units they are fighting, the way in which the Russian military will deal with them in the future will be a clear indicator of his involvement in the war and how well according to him, it is running.
www.onet.pl/informacje/onetwiadomosci/co-wykorzystanie-rosyjskich-poborowych-mowi-nam-o-wojnie-na-ukrainie/z8m50xj,79cfc278
Young Russian POWs
One of the signs of the weakness of the Russian army is the fact it sends young conscripts, practically boys, to fight in Ukraine.
What the fact that conscripts are fighting in Ukraine tells us about the condition of the Russian army
Pushing unprofessional soldiers into battle is a sign of desperation.
Suzanne B. Freeman, Katherine Kjellstrom Elgin
7.1 thous.
Today, 13:40
Russian army in UkraineRussian army in Ukraine - EPA / STRINGER / PAP
Conscription is a thorny topic in Russia, and the Kremlin's use of conscripts indicates to what extent the country's leaders believed they could hide the cost of the war from society. But now that their deployment has become public, what does Russia's continued use of conscripts tell us about this war and the future course of the conflict?
The short answer is that the war is not going as well as planned, and the use of conscripts may create more problems for the Russian leadership.
The Russian military personnel consists of four basic groups: officers, (a very small pool of) non-commissioned officers, contract workers and conscripts. Historically, conscription in Russia has been used to ensure that large sections of the population receive military training in the event of mobilization for a great war and to reduce the cost of maintaining the army.
Invasion of Ukraine. The USA is considering disconnecting Russia from the GPS system [LIVE REPORT]
As a rule, military personnel in Russia are not allowed to travel abroad. Under current law, Russia requires all men between the ages of 18 and 27 to report for conscription, usually for a period of one year, and then transfer to the mandatory reserve.
Currently, most estimates say that around 25 percent. of the Russian army consists of conscripts, the number of which varies according to the military service and the type of unit. And although Russia has attempted to switch to a professional army - mainly to increase the level of training and expertise of its soldiers - the country has to reconcile professionalisation with the need to maintain a large army.
However, public support for conscription in Russia is limited, and the very appointment of conscripts is controversial. Conscripts tend to be less capable than their contract counterparts because their length of service limits their training. And although a longer conscription period would lead to the creation of a more efficient conscription force, such a decision would prove unpopular with the Russian public.
Consequently, if they are exploited, conscripts are typically hired in less technical-savvy roles, such as logistics, which has already proved to be a key problem in Russian operations in Ukraine.
Moreover, because of the widespread abuse of conscripts - the brutal Russian version of the Polish wave - used since the Soviet Union, conscripts also have lower morale and the units they serve have less coherence. The Russian military has had various successes in reducing the effects of this phenomenon, but bullying remains a serious problem, leading to widespread attempts to obtain discharge from service.
Moreover, the use of conscripts in active combat will affect many Russian families and may cause a negative public reaction as the number of victims increases. During the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, the Soviet command was so concerned about public indignation over the victims and the denial of the reality of the war that it sent home soldiers killed in action in sealed zinc coffins. This comparison shouldn't escape anyone's head.
Apparently, the internal pressure is so strong that the Russian government has felt compelled to admit that they are serving conscripts in Ukraine. Last Tuesday, Putin promised that no Russian conscripts would be used in the war against Ukraine, but a day later the Defense Ministry publicly confirmed that there were Russian conscripts in Ukraine and that some of them had been taken prisoner.
The Russian government has pledged to send them all home and prevent their further deployment. And earlier this week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in a speech on stopping the conflict, directly appealed to Russian conscripts to surrender.
Prior to their official announcement, reports of their presence were circulating in Russia, and although information from Ukraine is difficult to decode, texts to mothers and videos of crying soldiers at the front appeared. Videos of Russian prisoners suggest that at least some of them did not know they were going to fight in Ukraine, and there are reports of low morale among Russian soldiers.
In Russia, the Committee of Mothers of Soldiers also expressed concern that conscripts are forced to sign contracts before crossing the border with Ukraine - a practice reportedly used by Russia in Ukraine in 2014.
The use of conscripts by the Russian military, despite all these shortcomings, proves that the Kremlin thought of this campaign as very easy. Conscripts do not serve elite units, and early assessments of Russian operational plans suggest that it was the elite units that were supposed to secure the area quickly and without much resistance.
In the face of the unexpected results of the Ukrainian army, however, Russia had to send more units to combat and it is unlikely that it would have used conscripts if it did not consider it necessary - their involvement may also be a sign that attempts by contract soldiers to meet the military's staffing needs failed.
And if, as suggested by the Russian government, the sending of conscripts to Ukraine was accidental, this is a bad sign of the Russian command, as well as of serious problems with personnel control in the Russian officer corps.
The situation also suggests the extent to which Russian officials had to assume that they could control domestic discourse. While the Kremlin controls most of the media coverage and tightens its control of the information space more and more, bad news from the front is hard to hide. And when mothers are unable to call their sons or when they begin to return with wounds or in coffins, the realities of the war can fuel the anger of the Russian people, as was the case during the Soviet-Afghan war.
So the hands of the Russian government are tied. As the war is more difficult than anticipated, the military needs more personnel in combat and support roles. However, if it continues to use conscripts, especially in large numbers, this can be seen as a sign of increasing desperation.
Pushing more recruits into Ukraine or using them after promises to be brought home not only means that the Russian military is sending less capable forces to the front, but also risks increasing the human cost of the war in the country, which could lead to further public outrage .
Regardless of the reason for their deployment, the use of Russian conscripts in the war in Ukraine is a bad sign of the Russian army's capabilities and readiness for this conflict. And while we still do not know to what extent conscripts are represented in the Russian forces in Ukraine or in what units they are fighting, the way in which the Russian military will deal with them in the future will be a clear indicator of his involvement in the war and how well according to him, it is running.
www.onet.pl/informacje/onetwiadomosci/co-wykorzystanie-rosyjskich-poborowych-mowi-nam-o-wojnie-na-ukrainie/z8m50xj,79cfc278
Young Russian POWs